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REFLECTIONS ON "FROM SLAVES TO
CITIZENS"
Robert J. Kaczorowski *
The thesis of Professor Donald Nieman's paper, "From Slaves
to Citizens: African-Americans, Rights Consciousness, and Reconstruction,"1 is that the nation experienced a revolution in the
United States Constitution and in the consciousness of AfricanAmericans. According to Professor Nieman, the Reconstruction
Amendments represented "a dramatic departure from antebellum
constitutional principles,"' because the Thirteenth Amendment reversed the pre-Civil War constitutional guarantee of slavery and
"abolish[ed] slavery by federal authority."' 3 The Fourteenth
Amendment rejected the Supreme Court's "racially-based definition of citizenship [in Dred Scott v. Sandford4 ], clearly establishing
a color-blind citizenship" 5 and the Fifteenth Amendment "wrote
the principle of equality into the Constitution." 6 Professor Nieman
also states that "in the course of a decade, the nation had moved
from slavery to freedom, and from a constitutional order that sancto one that embraced equality of civil and
tioned white supremacy
7
political rights."
Equally revolutionary "was the change in consciousness that
occurred among African-Americans." 8 The "constitutional vision"
of African-Americans was the inspiration for the "equalitarian
constitutionalism" expressed in the Reconstruction Amendments
and their guarantees of "color-blind citizenship" and "equal
rights."9 Professor Nieman traces the origins of these revolutionary changes to Northern African-American leaders who fought for
equal rights during the era of slavery before the Civil War. These
* Professor of Law, Fordham University School of Law; B.S.C., Loyola University of
Chicago; M.A., DePaul University; Ph.D., University of Minnesota; J.D., New York
University.
1 Donald G. Nieman, From Slaves to Citizens: African-Americans, Rights Consciousness, and Reconstruction, 17 CARDOZO L. REv. 2115 (1996).
2 Id. at 2116.
3 Id. (footnote omitted).
4 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
5 Nieman, supra note 1, at 2116.
6 Id.
7 Id. at 2117.
8 Id.
9 Id.
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leaders "pressed their constitutional vision on Republican policy
makers in Washington," during the revolutionary years of the Civil
War and Reconstruction, and they "took it to the South, where it
found a receptive audience" among the former slaves who "eagerly
embraced doctrines of color-blind citizenship and equal rights and
used them to shake the foundations of the southern social order."1
Indeed, commitment of African-Americans "to equalitarian constitutionalism reached far beyond Reconstruction and contained
profound implications for American constitutionalism and AfricanAmerican culture" far into the twentieth century."
Equalitarian constitutionalism shook, but did not topple, the
Southern social order. Adverse interpretations of the Reconstruction Amendments by the Supreme Court, combined with "the juggernaut of lynching, disfranchisement, and Jim Crow,"1 succeeded
in reducing African-Americans to second class citizenship. However, equalitarian constitutionalism and the activism of AfricanAmericans in the twentieth century continued to challenge white
hegemony through the post-World War II period.
There are several issues that are raised by, but not addressed
in, Professor Nieman's paper. For example, what exactly was the
nature of the "color-blind citizenship" that transformed the Constitution into an equalitarian document? This question encompasses
several others of fundamental importance regarding American federalism and the scope of authority conferred by the Reconstruction
Amendments on Congress, United States attorneys, and federal
judges to enforce the rights of Americans. What kinds of rights
violations did their framers intend to redress? That is, what rights
did they intend to protect and from whom did they intend to protect them. What kinds of remedies did they contemplate? How
did they envision the legal process through which often illiterate
and impoverished Americans would enforce their rights?
Professor Nieman mentions some of the specific rights understood by the historical actors as the rights that the freedmen were
to enjoy, as free men, and citizens of the United States. Some of
the rights that were demanded and achieved included: the right to
enter and enforce contracts, the right to own land, the right to the
protection of their persons and property, and an equality in political rights, such as the right to serve as jurors, the right to vote, and
the right to serve in public office. Professor Nieman asserts that
10 Id.

11 Id.
12 Id. at 2136.
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antebellum Northern African-American leaders insisted that African-Americans "were entitled to full equality.' 1 3 After the Civil
War, equal rights offered the former slaves "independence from
white authority and, therefore, the autonomy ... essential to freedom."' 4 He thus notes that, in addition to equality in economic
and political rights and equality before the law, African-Americans demanded and, to a significant extent, achieved social equality
through laws and, at least in state law, in court decisions prohibiting racial discrimination in public schools, places-of public accommodations, places of public amusement, and transportation.
However, Professor Nieman acknowledges that the efforts of African-Americans to achieve social equality through the Fourteenth
Amendment failed. 15 This failure raises some question concerning
the nature of the "equalitarian constitutionalism" the framers of
the Reconstruction Amendments had in mind. Did their framers
possess the same "constitutional vision" of African-Americans or
the same understanding of "color-blind citizenship" and "equalitarian constitutionalism"? What rights did the framers of the Reconstruction Amendments intend Americans to enjoy as free men and
as citizens of the constitutionally revolutionized United States?
Constitutional scholars and historians have debated this question over the last one hundred years.1 6 The difficulty in answering
it is due to the lack of precision in the framers' understanding, a
deficiency which is attributable, to a significant degree, to the ambiguities in nineteenth century theories of citizenship and citizens'
rights.' 7 While most constitutional scholars believe that the
13 See id. at 2119.
14 Id. at 2128.
15 See id. at 2139.
16 See Robert J. Kaczorowski, Searchingfor the Intent of the Framers of the Fourteenth
Amendment, 5 CONN. L. REV. 368, 368 (1972-73); Robert J. Kaczorowski, Revolutionary
Constitutionalismin the Era of the Civil War and Reconstruction, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 863,
864-71 (1986) [hereinafter Kaczorowski, Revolutionary Constitutionalism].
17 See JAMES H. KETNER, THE DEVELOPMENT OF AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP, 1608-1870
(1978); Kaczorowski, Revolutionary Constitutionalism, supra note 16, at 922-38. I argue
that the framers' believed that the Constitution secured the generic rights to life, liberty
and property, and rights incident thereto, as the fundamental rights of United States citi-

zenship. They enumerated some of the rights they believed were incidents of these generic
rights in section one of the Civil Rights Act of 1866: the right to make and enforce contracts, to sue, to serve as witnesses in court, to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and

convey real and personal property, and the right to full and equal benefit of all laws and
proceedings for the security of person and property. Ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27 § 1 (1866). It is my
view that, although these were some of the rights the framers believed were necessary to
the enjoyment of life, liberty and property, they did not intend to limit statutory and constitutional protection of citizens' rights to those enumerated in the Civil Rights Act.
Rather, they had an evolutionary understanding of citizens' rights which would change
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Supreme Court in the Slaughter-House Cases 8 interpreted the
Fourteenth Amendment's privileges or immunities clause more
narrowly than the framers intended in rejecting its apparent guarantee of fundamental rights, the question of what rights the framers intended to secure remains controversial. 19 This debate was
revived in the 1940s by Justice Hugo Black in his dissenting opinion
in Adamson v. California20 where he insisted that the framers of
the Fourteenth Amendment intended to incorporate the Bill of
Rights as constitutionally enforceable rights against state infringements. 21 Raoul Berger and Michael Curtis have continued this debate into this decade,22 and other2 3 scholars, such as Akhil Reed
Amar, have also contributed to it.
The Court in Brown v. Board of Education24 attempted to resolve the question whether the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment intended to guarantee the right of African-American children
to attend public schools on a desegregated basis. The N.A.A.C.P.
retained constitutional historian Alfred Kelly, among others, to research this question. The Court ultimately concluded that this
over time to include additional specific rights which, at a later time, might be deemed to be
essential to life, liberty, and property even though they were not necessarily considered so
in the framers' era.
18 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873).
19 Even Raoul Berger's polemical attack on the Warren Court for interpreting the
Fourteenth Amendment too broadly in securing citizens' fundamental rights, acknowledges that Justice Miller's catalog of the privileges and immunities secured by the Fourteenth Amendment was "[s]o meager ... as to move Justice Field to exclaim that if this was
all the privileges or immunities clause accomplished, 'it was a vain and idle enactment.' "
RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 37-38 (1977).

20 332 U.S. 46 (1947). Charles Fairman published a rebuttal to Justice Black in his
article entitled Charles Fairman, Does the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporatethe Bill of
Rights?, 2 STAN. L. REV. 5 (1949). William Crosskey rebutted Fairman in William Crosskey, "Legislative History" and the ConstitutionalLimitationson State Authority, 22 U. CHI.
L. REV. 1 (1954), to which Fairman responded in Charles Fairman, A Reply to Professor
Crosskey, 22 U. CHI. L. REV. 144 (1954).
21 Adamson, 332 U.S. at 71-72 (Black, J., dissenting).
22 See BERGER, supra note 19, at 134-56; MICHAEL CURTIS, No STATE SHALL
ABRIDGE: THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE BILL OF RIGHTS (1986); RAOUL BERGER, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE BILL OF RIGHTS (1989); Michael Curtis,

The Bill of Rights as a Limitation on State Authority: A Reply to Professor Berger, 16
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 45 (1980); Raoul Berger, Incorporationof the Bill of Rights in the
Fourteenth Amendment. A Nine-Lived Cat, 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 435 (1981); Michael Curtis,
FurtherAdventures of the Nine-Lived Cat: A Response to Mr. Berger on Incorporation of
the Bill of Rights, 43 OHIO ST. L.J. 84 (1982); Raoul Berger, Incorporationof the Bill of
Rights: A Reply to Michael Curtis' Reply, 44 OHIO ST. L.J. 1 (1983).
23 See Akhil R. Amar, The Bill of Rights and the FourteenthAmendment, 101 YALE L.J.
1193 (1992).
24 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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question could not be answered conclusively. 25 However, legal
scholars and historians, including Professor Kelly,26 Alexander
Bickel 2 7 and, most recently, Michael McConnell, 28 have attempted
to resolve this issue on one side of the question or the other.
The concept of a constitutionally guaranteed right to "colorblind citizenship" raises a question of a different nature: what role
did the framers envision the law playing in citizens' enjoyment of
the new "color-blind citizenship"? This question not only relates
to the issue of what rights were to be protected, but who would
protect them and how. The federalism dimension of this issue is
enormously important.29 The framers of the Fourteenth Amendment understood it, and the Thirteenth Amendment, as securing
the fundamental rights of free men as rights of United States citizenship.30 It was their view that, in securing the generic rights to
life, liberty, and property (and rights incident thereto), the Constitution delegated to Congress plenary authority to secure these
rights directly, not simply an equality in state-conferred rights.31
Indeed, Congress exercised plenary authority in enacting the Civil
Rights Act of 1866,32 the Enforcement Act of 1870, 33 and the Ku
Klux Klan Act of 1871. 34 These statutes conferred on the federal
courts primary civil and criminal jurisdiction to enforce the fundamental rights of United States citizens. Thus, the framers contemplated citizens enforcing their rights directly in the federal courts
whenever they were unable to do so through the state and local
legal process.35
For a brief period during Reconstruction, all three branches of
the national government were united in an effort to enforce civil
25 See id. at 489.
26 See Alfred Kelly, The Fourteenth Amendment Reconsidered: The Segregation Question, 54 MICH. L. REV. 1049, 1079-86 (1956) (framers of the Fourteenth Amendment did
not intend to prohibit segregated schools).
27 See Alexander Bickel, The Original Understandingand the Segregation Decision, 69
HARV. L. REV. 1, 56-65 (1955) (framers did not intend to desegregate public schools in
1866, but they did leave open the possibility of future court-ordered desegregation).
28 See Michael W. McConnell, Originalism and the Desegregation Decisions, 81 VA. L.
REV. 947 (1995) (framers intended not to prohibit segregated public schools).
29 See, e.g., Robert J. Kaczorowski, To Begin the Nation Anew: Congress, Citizenship,
and Civil Rights After the Civil War, 92 AM. HIsT. REV. 45 (1987).
30 See Kaczorowski, Revolutionary Constitutionalism,supra note 16, at 895-99, 910-17.
31 See id. at 884-99, 910-17, 922-35.
32 Ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27 (1866).
33 Ch. 114, 16 Stat. 140 (1870).
34 Ch. 22, 17 Stat. 13 (1871).
35 See Robert J. Kaczorowski, The Enforcement Provisions of the Civil Rights Act of
1886: A Legislative History in Light of Runyon v. McCrary, 98 YALE L.J. 565 (1989).
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rights. 36 United States Attorneys General and lawyers in the Department of Justice accepted the congressionally mandated duty to
enforce citizens' fundamental rights through federal legal process.
In areas of the South where the Ku Klux Klan overwhelmed local
officials, the only justice available was through the Department of
Justice and the federal courts. Federal legal officers restored law
and order in areas that had degenerated into anarchy. United
States attorneys, assisted by federal marshals and remnants of the
United States army, successfully prosecuted hundreds of Klansmen
under federal civil rights statutes for violating citizens' rights, such
as the First Amendment guarantees of freedom of speech and freedom of assembly, the Second Amendment right to bear arms, the
right to the equal protection of the laws for the security of person
and property. In addition, under the constitutionally guaranteed
rights to life and property, federal prosecutors convicted Klansmen
of violations of citizens' rights which, under state law, would have
constituted crimes such as murder, assault with intent to kill, burglary, and the like. Federal judges uniformly upheld the constitutionality of these statutes and the plenary authority they conferred
on federal courts to enforce citizens' civil rights. This was an enormous expansion of federal jurisdiction over fundamental rights.
Any discussion of the revolutionary nature of the Reconstruction
Amendments must address this aspect of their legal history.
This suggests that, notwithstanding the initiatives of AfricanAmericans in defining and securing the revolutionary new "colorblind citizenship," this process was connected to ideas and to
groups outside the African-American community. In stressing the
African-American inspiration for the principles of the Reconstruction Amendments, particularly the Fourteenth Amendment, Professor Nieman gives insufficient attention to the broader legal and
political culture of the period in shaping those principles and objectives. 37 For example, although African-Americans were the intended primary beneficiaries of constitutional and statutory
guarantees of citizens' rights, they were not the only intended beneficiaries. The evidence is clear that the framers intended also to
protect their white allies in the South.38 This insight suggests
sources of "equalitarian constitutionalism" beyond African-Ameri36

See

ROBERT J. KACZOROWSKI, THE POLITICS OF JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION: THE

FEDERAL COURTS, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE AND CIVIL RIGHTS, 1866-1876 (1985).
37 See, e.g., Kaczorowski, Revolutionary Constitutionalism, supra note 16, at 871-84;

Kaczorowski, supra note 35, passim.
38 See Kaczorowski, Revolutionary Constitutionalism,supra note 16, at 874-77, 897-98;
Kaczorowski, supra note 29, at 50-51.
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can activists, and that the Fourteenth Amendment was intended to
accomplish more than a "color-blind citizenship." In my view, it
was intended to nationalize citizenship and fundamental rights and
thereby confer plenary authority to protect the rights of all Americans, not only those of African-Americans.
The fact that the constitutional changes brought about by the
Reconstruction Amendments were so radical raises the additional
question of what led to their failure. Why did the United States
Supreme Court reject the most revolutionary aspects of these con39
stitutional changes? Why did the American public acquiesce?
How does one account for the temporary suspension of ingrained
racism and hostility to central power which permitted Republicans
during Reconstruction to revolutionize the Constitution? How
then does one explain the virulent resurgence of racism and states'
rights that permitted the rejection of revolutionary constitutional
guarantees by the end of the nineteenth century? Perhaps the answers to these questions will shed some light on why the struggle
continues to realize the promise of freedom that Americans
thought they had secured 130 years ago.

39 I have suggested some answers to these questions. See Robert J. Kaczorowski, The
Chase Court and FundamentalRights: A Watershed in American Constitutionalism,21 No.
Ky. L. REV. 151 (1993); KACZOROWSKI, supra note 36, at 199-227.

